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Using a dataset comprising of 505 venture capital deals conducted in Norway between 1993 
and 2012, this thesis examines the rate of successfully divesting portfolio companies and the 
corresponding holding period. By manually combing through every deal and determining 
entry date, exit date and exit type, we find the duration for a majority of the investments. 
Exit type is then binomially classified as either success or failure based on the category of 
exit.  
The framework of survival analysis is used to estimate the survival functions of the 
investments and provide unbiased, descriptive statistics on the investments and their time-to-
event, categorized as any successful exit. A competing risks analysis examines the effects of 
a number of covariates in terms of investment sector, fund type and investment stage. 
The analyses find significant differences between corporate venture capital funds and 
independent venture capital funds, with the corporate funds showing a tendency to hold their 
investments for a longer time span and having fewer successful exits. We further find a 
significantly lower incidence of successful exit among investments done at the seed stage 
and investments done in companies operating in the cleantech-sector.  
The results are tested by conducting a logistic regression. When including fixed fund effects, 
we find the statistical significance to deteriorate in some of the findings, but the general 
conclusions do not change.  
The findings have interesting implications for both investors and entrepreneurs in the venture 
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Actively managed portfolio companies generated a total value of 37.2 billion NOK in 2016, 
representing 1.6% of Norwegian mainland GDP and employing nearly 70 000 people 
(NVCA, 2017a).  Nearly half of these companies were owned by seed - and venture funds, 
thus constituting the largest growth potential. It could very well be that the next “unicorn” is 
a Norwegian start-up currently seeking funding, or already in a venture capital portfolio 
waiting to bloom, which is why it is important to have insight into the characteristics of the 
investment cycle and its outcomes.  
The successes and failures of new ventures are in large part determined by their early access 
to capital, necessitating a well-functioning private capital market to fuel innovative 
businesses and commercialize new technology. Venture capitalists play a vital role in 
nurturing start-ups when access to other forms of financing is limited, by providing growth 
capital and guidance in exchange for a stake in the company. The symbiosis of the 
entrepreneur and the risk financier is thus a paramount interaction in any productive 
economy.  
There are large risks involved when conducting venture investments, with low success rates 
and illiquid positions dictating the need to “make it big” when successfully divesting a 
portfolio company. The complicated process of developing a new venture with a successful 
exit in mind can be time-consuming, and there are a multitude of factors which affect both 
the likelihood of successful exit and the holding periods involved. This thesis will attempt to 
shed some light on the subject by providing insight into the length of the investment cycle of 
Norwegian venture capitalists investing in Norwegian portfolio companies by looking for 
differences with regards to sector, stage and fund type.  
We study time to exit for successful and failed investment outcomes from the venture 
capitalist’s point of view. Our goal is to illuminate the different factors that may explain how 
long a venture capitalist is involved in a portfolio company and how this may affect the 
likelihood of successfully exiting.  
Our empirical analyses are based on a dataset received from the Argentum Centre for Private 
Equity, providing a sample of Nordic private equity deals made between 1982 and 2012. We 
filter out all non-venture investments as well as non-Norwegian venture capitalist funds and 
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portfolio companies and are left with a sample of 505 venture deals. Our data includes 
information on stage and sector for all deals, but is mostly lacking in terms of entry date, exit 
date and exit type. We therefore spend a considerable amount of time collecting the 
necessary information on each individual deal and are successful in complementing around 
¾ of the data with complete holding periods and exit information. 
Our empirical work can be split into two parts. First, we use the method of survival analysis 
to estimate survival and hazard functions of different forms of venture investments. Survival 
analysis is well suited for our dataset as it enables us to use observations without full holding 
periods. In doing so we are able to include still active investments and investments missing 
exit dates, thus lessening the bias we would have had, had we not included them in the 
analyses.  
Secondly, we use logistic regression with successful exits as the predicted variable, 
estimating a number of factors though to affect the likelihood of successful exit. In using two 
different empirical approaches we are able to provide a robust analysis of the outcomes of 
Norwegian venture investments.  
The thesis is structured as follows: 
• Part 2 provides a theoretical background for our analysis, introducing relevant 
literature on the subject and detailing our specific research interests for the thesis.  
• Part 3 describes the data, the process of gathering extra information, and the variables 
included in the final set.  
• Part 4 provides descriptive statistics of the dataset 
• In part 5 we conduct a series of survival analyses, using both a non-parametric and a 
semi-parametric model to illustrate the exit outcomes as a function of months-to-exit.  
• In part 6 we use a logistic regression to determine if the data follows the same trends 
as found in part 5.  
• In part 7 we summarize our results, deliver concluding remarks and discuss 




In the following section we will provide definitions on private equity, venture capital and 
corporate venture capital, review literature relevant to the thesis, and discuss factors thought 
to influence the length of the investment cycle and exits. Lastly, we discuss our main 
interests for the thesis and formulate three specific research questions.  
2.1 Private Equity 
Private equity (PE), as defined by the European Venture Capital Association, is “the 
provision of equity capital by financial investors - over the medium or long term – to non-
quoted companies with high growth potential” (EVCA, 2007).  
Private equity thus mainly differs from public equity in that it refers to investments in 
companies which cannot be traded on a public exchange. This entails that PE investments 
are illiquid and difficult to value. Furthermore, PE generally involves active ownership, with 
the investor involved in monitoring and assisting the portfolio company (PC). Disregarding 
participation in shareholders meetings, investors in public companies do not have the same 
degree of control over their investments. Active ownership can result in additional value 
added besides the capital itself as investors contribute with industry expertise and networks. 
This process takes time, and the holding periods are therefore generally longer than with 
traditional investments in stocks and bonds. 
PE funds are typically structured as a limited partnership with the investors acting as the 
limited partner (LP) and the firm managing the fund acting as the general partner (GP).  
2.2 Venture Capital 
Venture capital (VC) is a subset of private equity which generally applies to entrepreneurial 
undertakings rather than mature businesses and refers to investments made to launch or 
accelerate early development and expansion of a business (EVCA, 2007).  
Metrick and Yasuda (2010) define 5 main characteristics of venture capital funds: 
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1. A VC is a financial intermediary, investing its investors’ capital directly into 
portfolio companies 
2. A VC invests only in private companies – those not listed on a public exchange 
3. A VC takes an active role in monitoring and helping portfolio companies 
4. A VC’s primary goal is to maximize its financial return by exiting its investments 
through a sale or an Initial Public Offering (IPO) 
5. A VC invests to fund the internal growth of companies 
Characteristic (1) is important as it separates VCs from angel investors, who use their own 
capital and therefore do not function as a financial intermediary. When investing one’s own 
money, the cost of capital will generally be lower as all the returns are kept by the investors, 
and there is therefore a difference in the economic dynamics compared to VC investing. 
Angel investors are thus often able to invest in deals unavailable to VCs.  
VC funds are, like other PE funds, structured as a limited partnership. The venture capitalist, 
or GP, raises capital from a number of LPs which is then invested through the fund into a 
portfolio of companies. The limited partners remain limited due to their lack of involvement 
in the investment decisions of the fund. 
Characteristic (2) entails that VC investments are illiquid and difficult to value accurately. 
As we shall discuss further, this means that the timing and type of exit is of paramount 
importance for the VC, and planning for it is an essential part of the due diligence process. 
The illiquidity of investments in private companies also has a profound effect on the holding 
periods, which are, as we will see later on, subject to a number of factors. 
The means through which VCs monitor and help their portfolio companies usually takes 
place through at least one position on the board of directors. This gives the VC an 
opportunity to oversee their investment and separates them from a passive investor. In taking 
an active role in the portfolio company a VC is adding value besides capital, and their 
returns will not only be contingent upon the ability to choose the right opportunities, but also 
how they take part in the business development. Moreover, VCs often possess deep industry 
knowledge and a wide network which can be highly valuable to young ventures. In taking on 
the role of an active owner the VC is able to reduce the operational risk associated with the 
PC. This oversight is a defining characteristic of VC investing, and believed to be a source of 
competitive advantage for VC-owned companies compared to others (Sorensen, 2007). 
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Characteristic (4) defines the preferred types of exit for a VC investor. As the PCs usually do 
not generate positive cashflows in the early stage, and the focus in general is on growing the 
business, the VC cannot expect any dividends. Thus, the only means through which the fund 
may gather a return on its investment is through a profitable exit. This characteristic further 
differentiates VC investing from strategic investments done by large corporations. A VC has 
a clear goal, with a given time horizon and preferred exit designed to maximize the financial 
returns, whereas a corporate investor can have other, strategic motives for buying into a 
company. The need for a planned exit is therefore not as strongly present, and the strategic 
investor will behave differently from the VC.  
An amalgation of the two, which we will discuss in detail later, is corporate venture capital 
(CVC) funds. These are venture arms of corporations that operate as traditional VC funds but 
may also have the parent’s strategic goals in mind when making investment decisions in 
addition to purely financial motives.  
Lastly, characteristic (5) summarizes the main function of a VC: to help companies grow 
organically. The means through which this is achieved is, as mentioned, both through the 
supply of capital and active participation in staking out the companies’ future course.  
The VC investment cycle incorporates the process of the investment from screening and 
deciding on a deal to exiting its position in the portfolio company. To simplify, we roughly 
divide the investment cycle in 3 parts; pre-deal, pre-exit and exit. For the purposes of this 
thesis we are mostly interested in the exit stage and its relation to the length of the 
investment cycle. 
A VC may choose to invest in a number of different company stages, which can roughly be 
divided in the following (Metrick & Yasuda, 2010); seed stage, early stage, mid stage and 
later stage. For the purpose of this thesis we mostly differentiate between the seed stage, 
which is a company at the preliminary stages of proving concept, and the rest, which we 
simply refer to as the venture stage. There are intuitive differences in risk between the two, 
and, as will be discussed later, intrinsic differences in both the likelihood of success and the 
duration of the investments.  
VCs prefer to invest in companies with substantial technological risk and high upside 
potential (Ghosh & Nanda, 2010). As the technological risk is not resolved before significant 
investments have been made in the PC, large amounts may have been invested before a 
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project is written off. To compensate for this, VCs spread the risk over several investments 
in a portfolio of companies, and the investments that do succeed make up for the losses 
incurred by the others. As many investments are generally made to dispense the technology 
risk over several investments, VCs further prefer to invest in companies with low capital 
intensity (Kerr & Nanda, 2010). The preference for technological risk and upside potential 
combined with low capital demands make sectors such as information and communications 
technology ideal for the purposes of VC investing. Companies in this sector often 
commercialize quickly, allowing for a shorter holding period before exit. On the other end of 
the spectrum are companies that require large initial investments to gain commercial 
viability, such as those needing to build manufacturing plants or scale up a prototype 
technology. If the potential PC demands too large an initial investment relative to the capital 
available to the VC, it will generally not be chosen.  
As downside protection against the high risk of the companies in which they do invest, VCs 
often demand convertible shares, thus hedging some of the risk while still being able to 
participate in the upside should the investment succeed (Gompers & Lerner, 2004). By 
staging their investments and extend the financing of a PC conditional upon it reaching 
earlier defined “milestones”, the VC only supports those companies continuing to show 
promise of success.  
VC funds are structured to have a lifespan of about 10 years (Ghosh & Nanda, 2010), and 
are typically compensated in the form of a management fee of around 2% of committed 
capital as well as carried interest at around 20% of excess return. Gompers and Lerner 
(2004) theorize that VCs prefer to exit their investments well before the 10-year mark. In 
doing so, they can establish a track record of successful exits beneficial to raising new funds. 
Thus, one might infer that younger VCs without a proven track record are more likely to exit 
their investments early. Gompers (1996) further provides evidence for his theory of 
grandstanding in the VC industry, in which young VCs, in an effort to establish their 
reputation, take PCs public earlier than incumbent, senior funds. Individual VC 
characteristics are thereby likely to affect the exit decision.  
There exists a variety of exit options for VCs, the most common being (Cummings & 
MacIntosh, 2000):  
• IPO exit, in which the PC’s shares are sold to the public market 
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• acquisition exit, in which the PC is sold to a third party  
• a secondary sale, in which the VC’s shares are sold to a third party 
• a buyback, in which the VC’s shares are sold back to the PC 
• write-offs, in which the PC is liquidated at no profit for the VC  
All of these exits entail a different set of factors thought to affect the holding period of the 
investment. 
Cummings and MacIntosh (2000) examine the relationship between investment duration and 
exit strategy of a sample of venture capital investments in the USA and Canada, finding a 
number of factors to be of statistical significance on the holding period of the investments. 
Most notable among these is a significant difference with regards to the stage of firm at first 
investment. The earlier the investment is in the PC lifespan, the riskier it is. However, given 
that more equity can be attained for a lower price in the seed stage, the upside potential is 
generally much higher.  
Cumming and Johan (2010) further suggest that VCs exit when the expected marginal cost 
of maintaining the investment exceeds the expected marginal benefit, and formulate a 
number of factors related to PC and VC characteristics as well as market conditions 
impacting this.  
2.3 Corporate Venture Capital 
Corporate Venture Capital (CVC) is the systematic practice by established corporations of 
making equity investments in entrepreneurial ventures (Drover et al., 2017). CVC funds 
mostly invest in emerging, innovative companies with technologies that are strategically 
aligned with the parent firm (Ernst et al., 2005). This form of corporate investing originated 
in the US in the 1960s and has been rapidly increasing in the last decades. Now large 
corporations in nearly all sectors are establishing CVC units (EY, 2018). 
In many ways, CVC funds share similarities with Independent Venture Capital (IVC) funds. 
However, as discussed in detail by Chemmanur et al. (2014), there are some structural 
differences which may have an effect on investment activity and exits.  
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CVCs are stand-alone subsidiaries of non-financial corporations who invest in new ventures 
on behalf of the parent (Chemmanur et al., 2014). They generally operate as evergreen funds, 
as the lack of traditional LPs leads to an initially unlimited time-horizon on investments. The 
structure of a limited partnership limits an IVCs lifespan, and it is unable to invest more than 
the capital initially committed by its LPs.  CVCs do not have such constraints, leaving them 
free to pursue investment opportunities with a longer time to fruition. Contrarily, Rajan et al. 
(2000) argue that as CVCs are subject to centralized resource allocation, they are not as free 
to invest at will as their IVC counterparts.  
 CVCs further differ from IVCs in their compensation schemes (Dushnitsky & Shapira, 
2007). As opposed to IVCs traditional, incentive-aligning system of carried interest and a 
management fee, CVCs managerial compensation is generally a fixed salary and corporate 
bonuses tied to parent performance. This lack of purely performance driven compensation 
may lead to CVCs being more open to experimentation and exhibit a higher failure 
tolerance, thereby lowering their rate of successful exits.   
It might also be theorized that by tying CVCs compensation to that of the parent company, 
the best interests of the PC are not always considered. CVCs may be incentivized to advance 
the interests of the parent at the expense of the PC and often invest with a strategic goal in 
mind, as opposed to the purely financial motives of their IVC counterparts. While CVC also 
strive to earn returns, the primary owner of a CVC is another company. The parent does not 
rely on earnings made from the fund to persist in the long run, and consequently the 
management of a CVC does not necessarily face the same pressure to deliver high financial 
returns (Gompers & Lerner, 2000). There are often commonalities between the chosen PCs 
and the sectors in which the parent’s main area of business resides. Consequently, the parent 
company provides a potential exit for CVC PCs, and may choose to liquidate the investment 




2.4 Research Questions 
As we have seen, there is an abundance of factors discussed in the literature thought to 
influence both the choice of exit and the holding periods of VC investments. Naturally, the 
scope of this thesis as well as the data available prevents us from examining them all. We 
therefore restrict our analysis to focus on a select number of factors thought to influence 
holding periods and exits. To do so, we use a dataset comprising of Norwegian deals from 
1993-2012, which we intend to use to present an analysis of the Norwegian VC market. In 
our analyses we are interested in providing an empirical discussion on investment lengths of 
failed and successful investments as well as differences between sectors, investment stages 
and fund structure.  
We have formulated three research questions illustrating our main interests in the topic.  
Research question I 
Is there a difference in holding periods and the rate of successful exits between CVCs and 
IVCs in the Norwegian market? 
Based on the previously discussed nature of CVC investments, we hypothesize a lower rate 
of successful exits and longer holding periods for CVC compared to IVC.  
Research question II 
Are there significant differences between sectors? 
We wish to provide a descriptive analysis of the Norwegian VC market, detailing which 
sectors represent the largest part of VC investments. Furthermore, we wish to examine if 
there are statistical differences in holding periods and outcomes between sectors.  
Research question III 
Are there significant differences between investment stages? 
We hypothesize that seed investments are riskier than later stage VC deals, and as such 
expect a lower rate of successful exits.  
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3. Data 
The empirical work presented in this thesis is based on a dataset received from the Argentum 
Centre for Private Equity. We received two datasets containing information on Nordic PE 
deals ranging from 1982-2012 and 2013-2016 respectively. As the primary interest of this 
thesis is to look at investment outcomes, we ignored the latter dataset owing to the fact that 
most of these investments were still active. In this section we describe the sample available 
to us and detail the process of gathering information to supplement the dataset. 
3.1 Initial Demands for Dataset 
Our primary concern when analysing venture deals has been biased results due to the nature 
of PE-reporting, which tends to underreport failed investments and highlight successful exits 
(Scott, 1994).  
When complementing the dataset with holding periods, finding entry and exit dates on 
successful investments proved significantly easier than finding the equivalent information on 
failures. As such, efforts would need to be made to ensure we did not allow for survivorship 
bias by finding disproportionally more information on successful investments. Secondly, as 
we were interested in comparing IVC and CVC investments, we needed to correctly identify 
and isolate CVC investments. To be able to test for significant differences between the two it 
would be necessary to have a large enough sample size of CVC investments. Thirdly, we 
would need information on entry and exit times as well as exit type for a majority of the 
data. When no information on exit was available, we would need to find the latest date we 
knew the VC to hold a position.  
3.2 Filtering of Data 
1. Removing other PE-investments 
Our interest is in VC deals, and as such we removed all investments marked as buyout, 
leaving only those classified as seed or venture. Our earliest observation is then from 1993.  
2. Removing investments by non-Norwegian VCs 
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All non-Norwegian VCs were removed from the dataset, as we wanted the focus to be on the 
Norwegian market. We define Norwegian VCs as firms headquartered in Norway.  
3. Removing investments in non-Norwegian PCs.  
All investments in companies headquartered outside of Norway were removed from the 
dataset. This made the data gathering process as described in section 3.3 easier and we do 
not complicate the subsequent analyses with factors relating to foreign investment. We are 
thus left with investments made by Norwegian VCs in Norwegian PCs 
4. Removing investments missing vital information and duplicates 
Some observations lacked crucial information such as name of PC or VC, which limited our 
ability to find their outcomes and holding period lengths. These investments were removed 
from the dataset. Some investments were also recorded more than once to account for 
several rounds of financing. In these cases, only the first round of investment was included 
in the final dataset. 
Table 3.1 shows each step of the filtering process. 
 
Initial number of observations 4818 
Removing non-VC deals  -2957 
 
Removing non-Norwegian funds -1068 
Removing investments in non-Norwegian portfolio companies -264 
Removing investments with unnamed VC or PC and duplicates -24 
 
Remaining number of observations  505 
 
Table 3.1 – The filtering process 
3.3 Gathering Data 
The dataset was lacking in terms of information about investment lengths. 227 observations 
included entry date, and only 82 observations had a recorded exit date. 92 observations 
included exit type. Thus, information on entry- and exit date as well as exit type would have 
to be manually collected for a majority of the dataset, mostly through open sources.  
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The main source of information has been Venturexpert1, which is a useful tool for gathering 
entry dates in particular, as it in many cases provides detailed information about investment 
rounds in PCs. When Venturexpert yielded no results, the missing information could in some 
cases be found using databases such as CrunchBase2 and Pitchbook3. However, these sources 
proved inadequate in providing detailed information on failed investments. 
Gathering exit data on failed investments proved challenging due to the previously discussed 
issues of underreporting failed investments amongst VCs. The webpages of VCs often 
display the active investments in their portfolio and only a select number of successful exits. 
Following the logic that failed investments would be deleted from the list of active PCs and 
not included among selected exits, we used the online internet archive Wayback Machine4 to 
find the last date an investment was displayed on the VCs homepage. An approximate exit 
time could then be deduced by taking the median date between last known active date and 
first known non-active date.  
The same logic was applied to other open sources, such as online newspapers and annual 
company reports. As such, we were able to gather approximate exit dates on a number of 
failed investments. In other cases, we were only able to record the last date we knew the VC 
to have been active. This still conveys valuable information for the survival analyses that 
will be conducted in part IV and was consequently included in the dataset as last active as of.  
Many companies that have received VC funding and failed to develop to a successful exit 
continue to operate as dormant companies, typically only employing one or two people and 
generating low to no turnover. In these cases, the logic that VCs often take board positions 
was followed, and consequently the last date a VC held a position on the board was used as 
the write-off time.  
                                                 
1 VentureXpert is a database providing comprehensive information about private equity deals. We were able to access it 
through NHH’s subscription to SDC Platinum.  
2 CrunchBase is a platform providing information on investment rounds and funding amounts  
3 PitchBook is a database providing data on the private capital market 
4 Wayback machine is a digital archive of the internet, allowing the user to access webpages as they looked on selected 
historical dates 
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For some investments, the VC appeared active until the PC was liquidated. Liquidation dates 
as recorded on www.Proff.no5 was then recorded as the exit date.   
3.4 Potential Bias 
We identify two main sources of potential bias in the dataset; survivorship bias and sample 
bias. 
3.4.1 Survivorship Bias 
Survivorship bias arises when one overlooks observations that have not survived a given 
selection process. In looking at the performance of a portfolio of companies that includes 
only surviving companies, we risk survival bias (Rohleder et al., 2010). 
The difficulty in finding information on failed investments involves a potential for 
survivorship bias in the completed dataset. After supplementing the investment lengths as 
detailed in section 3.3, 128 observations had incomplete holding periods due to no 
information on either entry, exit or both. As will be discussed later, the burden of proof lies 
with the successful exits, and we can safely assume a majority of these investments to be 
failed ones. Not including them in the following analyses would result in misleading 
estimates of success rates and holding periods, and we intend to control for this issue by 
using survival analysis.  
3.4.2 Sample Bias 
The original dataset had the potential for sample bias if certain types of investments were 
overrepresented relative to others. This thesis is based on the assumption of the ACPE 
providing an unbiased sample of VC deals, thus precluding any particular sample bias from 
being prevalent. Upon looking at the activity of the funds in the dataset in the time period, 
we found some investments which were not included amongst the observations. Given this, 
we cannot conclude that the dataset contains all Norwegian VC investments conducted in the 
time period. However, assuming no particular trend in the omitted observations, we proceed 
with our analysis unconcerned with sample bias in the dataset.  
                                                 
5 www.Proff.no is a database of accounting information, investors, board positions and more for Norwegian companies 
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3.5 Definition of Variables 
3.5.1 Investment Outcomes  
To allow for the use of dummy variables of success in our analyses, we differentiate between 
successful exits and failures. For the purpose of further studies, we would have preferred 
data on returns in order to measure relative degrees of success, but as finding this proved 
inexpedient the dataset was limited to binomial outcomes. We aspired to have a conservative 
measure on successful divestments. Thus, emphasis was placed upon the burden of proof 
lying with proving success, and all non-active investments in which no exit type was 
determined were classified as failures.  
The distinction between failure and success can be problematic to define clearly. In some 
cases, an exit is made which isolated could be regarded as successful. The question is where 
to draw the line. Is a failure only an investment in which the VC does not get back their 
capital? If we define failures only as those cases where the PC was liquidated at a complete 
loss for the VCs, we would get an excessively low failure rate, whereas if failure is defined 
as any investment which does not meet the VCs projected investment return we would get an 
excessively high failure rate.  
It is important to bear in mind the characteristics of VC investment; long holding periods; 
illiquid positions; the nature of VC compensation and large risks all imply the need for high 
returns on the investments that do succeed. Based on this we formulate a definition of 
success to use as a benchmark to assess investment outcomes: 
We define a successful divestment as any form of profitable exit which would be sustainable 
for the VC in the long run.  
We generalize the investment outcomes as success or failure by taking this definition into 
account. As we do not have information on specific investment returns, we cannot conclude 
with certainty that each investment is classified correctly as a failure or success. For 
example, a trade sale could become a loss for the VC by returning less than the original 
investment. Concurrently, an acquisition exit at a multiple of 2 of the invested amount for a 
holding period in excess of ten years can hardly be called very successful. Still, investment 
outcomes are classified as successes or failures based on the general sustainability of the 
outcome itself. In the completed dataset we are then left with the following outcomes: 
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1. IPO 
An IPO, or initial public offering, is the process through which a private company is made 
public by an initial share offer (Ritter & Welch, 2002). An IPO is one of two generally 
preferred exit strategies for a VC, the other being M&A (Metric & Yasuda, 2010). When a 
company is made public, the shares must still be sold on the market and it is not a given that 
a VC sells its entire position, but we still choose to treat any IPO in the dataset as a 
successful exit for the VC for the purposes of analysis. Exit dates are thus determined as the 
date of the IPO, and is easily found through open sources.  
2. M&A 
Mergers and acquisitions also represent a successful exit for the VC through the complete 
sale of its position. The most common form of M&A exit for VCs in our dataset is by trade 
sale, a simple acquisition in which the entire company is purchased by another. Exit dates 
for M&A are typically easily accessible on the previously mentioned databases.  
3. Share sale 
We have some observations of investments where a VCs position has been successfully 
exited through a share sale. This might be to another fund, to the management of the PC (a 
buyback) or to private investors. Share sales are characterized as successful exits.  
4. Secondary market sales 
The forms of secondary sales we have discovered in the dataset have been funds selling off 
their entire portfolios to other funds. After assessing each secondary sale individually, and 
bearing our definition of successful exits in mind, the secondary sales are classified as 
failures6.  
5. Write-offs 
Written off investments are investments that do not succeed, most of which have either been 
liquidated or continue to operate as dormant companies, generating low to no turnovers and 
with only one or two employees. Write-offs are classified as failed investments.  
                                                 
6 One can hardly argue that a sustainable form of VC investing would rely on building a portfolio only to sell it off in its 
entirety. We theorize that the cases we have seen have been due to closing down a fund with bad performance, resulting in 
positions being acquired for “cents on the dollar”. 
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6. Still active  
For the investments in which no exit has occurred, we set the date of exit as still active as of 
01.06.2018, as we cannot be certain that all sources are recently updated. As the burden of 
proof lies with proving success, still active investments are initially classified as failures.  
We do not have an outcome and thus cannot determine if these investments will be 
successful or not, and our interest is in their known holding periods for the purpose of the 
survival analyses in part 5. However, dormant companies in which the VC still holds a 
position are classified as write-offs. 
7. No info 
We searched extensively in order to deduce the holding periods and exit types of all 
investments in the dataset, but for around a quarter of the dataset we were not successful at 
finding one or both. It is safe to assume that nearly all of these are failed investments, and as 
the burden of proof lies with the successful exits, these are marked as failures.  
Our findings are summarized in table 3.2. 
Success Obs.   % Failure Obs.  % 


















































Table 3.2 – Exit outcomes in dataset  
 
3.5.2 Months-To-Exit 
We use investment and exit dates to generate a variable for the holding periods of each 
investment expressed in months.  
3.5.3 CVC  
We screened all funds to determine which were CVC funds, and included a dummy variable 
for each observation detailing if the investment was made by a CVC fund or not. Our 
definition of a CVC fund is any fund working as a corporate subsidiary of a non-financial 
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corporation. In total, we found 5 funds that could be classified as CVC funds, representing 
84 investments.  
3.5.4 Fund Activity  
To allow a measure of VC scope, a variable was added for each investment containing the 
number of other investments the given VC has in the dataset. A spread of risk through more 
investments tends to make the VCs less risk averse (Forbes, 2009), and we would therefore 
expect VCs with a high number of investments to have a lower success rate. 
3.5.5 Sector                            
The ACPE dataset had seven sector categories for the investments; cleantech7, consumer8, 
energy9, ICT10, industrial11, life science12 and other13. We included these classifications in 
the final set and formulated dummy variables for each sector.  
3.5.6 Seed  
The ACPE dataset differentiated between seed and venture when classifying investment 
stage. We are interested in determining if there are differences between seed investments and 
other venture investments, and therefore included a dummy variable for seed.  
VCs often invest in multiple rounds of financing, with new investors coming in at various 
stages. Ideally, our analyses would account for this through a variable detailing at which 
investment round the VC entered. However, we found that collecting information on this 
was not feasible, and thus only differentiate between seed and venture. Investments 
                                                 
7 Cleantech is a sector comprising of companies devoted to clean technology: most notably recycling, electric motors and 
renewable energy such as wind energy, solar energy, biofuels etc. 
8 Consumer is a sector comprising of companies devoted to serving the market of consumer goods 
9 Energy is a sector comprising of companies in the energy industry, most notably petroleum, gas, and electrical power 
10 ICT is a sector comprising of companies in the industry of information and communications technology 
11 The industrial sector is the secondary sector of the economy, and can be interpreted as industries manufacturing finished 
and semi-finished goods from raw materials 
12 Life science is a sector comprising of companies in the fields of biotechnology and pharmaceuticals 
13 Other is a term for all companies that cannot be accurately described as belonging to any of the aforementioned sectors 
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classified as venture will consequently account for all investment rounds that are not seed 
financing.  
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4. Descriptive Statistics 
In the following section we present a summary of our completed dataset. Tables 4.1-4.3 
present descriptive statistics on all deals, IVC deals and CVC deals.  
Table 4.1 All VC Deals 
This table presents descriptive statistics of all observations in the dataset. Success rates are included in 
parenthesis for each respective sector, stage and fund type. Fund activity represents the number of investments 
within each fund. As we were not able to determine the duration of all investments, total success rates including 
and excluding no info deals is added. Months-to-exit is calculated using all observations with complete holding 
periods, all successes with complete holding periods and all failures with complete holding periods.  
 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Cleantech (17,2%) 505 .127 .333 0 1 
 Consumer (26,1%) 505 .046 .209 0 1 
 Energy (39,1%) 505 .137 .344 0 1 
 ICT (46,6%) 505 .378 .485 0 1 
 Industrial (21,4%) 505 .083 .276 0 1 
 Lifescience (24,3%) 505 .147 .354 0 1 
 Other (40,5%) 505 .083 .276 0 1 
 Seed (34,1%) 505 .366 .482 0 1 
 Venture (37,8%) 505 .634 .482 0 1 
 Fund activity  505 21.505 11.561 1 45 
 IVC (38,2%) 505 .834 .373 0 1 
 CVC (17,9%) 505 .166 .373 0 1 
 Failure 505 .651 .477 0 1 
 Success w/noinfo 505 .349 .477 0 1 
 Success wo/noinfo 







































Table 4.2 IVC Deals  
This table presents descriptive statistics on IVC deals in the dataset. Success and failure rates are calculated 
including no info deals. Months-to-exit is calculated using all observations with complete holding periods, all 
successes and all failures.  
 
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Cleantech 421 .124 .329 0 1 
 Consumer 421 .048 .213 0 1 
 Energy 421 .138 .345 0 1 
 ICT 421 .363 .482 0 1 
 Industrial 421 .074 .261 0 1 
 Lifescience 421 .166 .373 0 1 
 Other 421 .088 .283 0 1 
 Seed 421 .418 .494 0 1 
 Venture 421 .582 .494 0 1 
 Fund activity 421 19.834 9.386 1 32 
 Failure 421 .618 .487 0 1 
 Success 421 .382 .487 0 1 
 Monthstoexit - all 322 79.817 42.592 6 228 
 Monthstoexit-success 161 68.359 41.300 6 210 
 Monthstoexit-failure 260 91.274 40.861 12 228                        




    Table 4.3 CVC Deals 
This table presents descriptive statistics on CVC deals in the dataset.  
Success and failure rates are calculated including no info deals. Months-to-exit is calculated using all 
observations with complete holding periods, all successes and all failures.  
 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std.Dev.  Min  Max 
 Cleantech 84 .143 .352 0 1 
 Consumer 84 .036 .187 0 1 
 Energy 84 .131 .339 0 1 
 ICT 84 .452 .501 0 1 
 Industrial 84 .131 .339 0 1 
 Lifescience 84 .048 .214 0 1 
 Other 84 .06 .238 0 1 
 Seed 84 .107 .311 0 1 
 Venture 84 .893 .311 0 1 
 Fund activity 84 29.881 16.754 5 45 
 Failure 84 .821 .385 0 1 
 Success 84 .179 .385 0 1 
 Monthstoexit - all 55 82.139 35.287 10 209 
 Monthstoexit-success 15 83.633 37.821 24 142 
 Monthstoexit-failure 
 
40 81.580  34.777 10 209 
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4.1 Fund type 
We identify only five CVC funds in the data, representing a total number of 84 investments. 
The low number of CVC funds is surprising, but we must bear in mind the time period of our 
dataset, and, as discussed in part 2, the rising trend of CVC internationally. Although more 
individual CVCs would have been preferred, we conclude that the relatively high number of 
investments proves sufficient for empirical analyses.                                                                                                                    
To check the prevalence of CVC funds in Norway today, we went through Kapital’s list of 
Norway’s largest companies14. Among the 200 largest companies we identified 3315 that had 
launched corporate venture programs, with a clear majority having been initiated after 2012. 
These findings are indicative of the fact that CVC programs are gaining popularity in 
Norway as well as internationally.  
4.2 Success Rate 
We observe a general success rate of around 35% when including no-info deals. This result 
must be interpreted with our definition of failure, as discussed in section 3, in mind. We can 
be certain that a written off investment is a failure but cannot necessarily conclude that a 
trade sale or share sale should be classified as successful. Consequently, we infer that at 
least 65% of the investments in our dataset resulted in failures.   
The opaque definitions of failure and success in other studies means we should be careful 
when comparing our results with these. Research from the U.S. market between 2000-2010 
indicate that only about 25% return their investors capital (Ghosh, quoted in Gage, 2012), 
and the U.S. National Venture Capital Association estimate that 25-30% fail completely 
(Gage, 2012).   
Our findings are more in line with Kräussl & Krause (2014), who also use a binomial 
measure of success and failure. They find a general success rate of 33% for European VC 
                                                 
14 Each year, the Norwegian financial newspaper Kapital compiles a list of Norway’s 500 largest companies. The list is 
accessible at www.kapital.no/norges-500-storste. 
15 16 of these were CVC divisions headquartered outside of Norway as the parent company was international. 
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investments in the same time period when using IPO, M&A, and buyouts as measures of 
successful exits.  
We further observe that IVC investments have a success rate of 38% compared to CVCs 
with 18%. This is in line with the hypothesis we developed in research question I, stating 
that IVCs would have more successful exits.  
4.3 Months-to-exit 
When calculating months-to-exit, investments that did not have both an entry and exit date 
had to be excluded. In doing so, 128 observations were removed. We should therefore not 
place too much emphasis on months-to-exit for failed investments, as this does not represent 
the whole sample of failed investments.  
We observe that the investments have a total average holding period of 80 months, or 6 years 
and 8 months. Additionally, we note a high standard deviation suggesting that the durations 
are spread out over a long range of values. The investment with the shortest duration in our 
dataset lasted only 6 months, whereas the longest lasted 19 years. Months-to-exit for all 
successful investments is around 70 months, or 5 years and 10 months. This implies that the 
average length a VC holds a portfolio company before successfully divesting is nearly 6 
years.  
For IVCs this figure is nearly the same, at 68 months. The CVCs in the data seem to hold 
their successful investments longer, divesting on average after 7 years.  
4.4 Sectors 
We notice, not surprisingly, that ICT has the largest share of the investments, with 38% of all 
deals, followed by lifescience, energy and cleantech. These findings follow the general 
trends of European VC investing (OECD, 2017; Statista, 2019), although energy appears 
more prevalent amongst Norwegian VC investors. The Norwegian economy’s dependence 
on oil and gas and the innate competency on the area that this entails may be an intuitive 
explanation for this. The findings also seem to show the same trend as the Norwegian 
Venture Capital and Private Equity Association find in their activity report for 2017 (NVCA, 
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2017b), suggesting that there have not been dramatic changes in the composition of sectors 
invested in in the last years.  
ICT is also the most successful sector, with a success rate of 47%, followed by other, energy 
and consumer. The least successful sector is cleantech, with a success rate of 17%.  
4.5 Stage 
37% of the observations in the dataset were seed investments, the rest were in venture. We 
note that seed investments are somewhat less successful than venture investments, with 
success rates of 34% and 38% respectively. This supports our hypothesis as formulated in 
research question III, that seed investments yield fewer successful exits. Although we would 
have expected a larger gap, the empirical analyses will have to determine if this is a 
significant difference.  
Surprisingly, only 11% of CVC investments were done at the seed stage, as opposed to 42% 
of IVC investments. This is interesting when considering the low rate of CVC success 
compared to IVC. Should our hypothesis from research question III be correct then we 
cannot attribute the higher success rates among IVC investments to preferences in PC stage. 
In fact, these preferences should lower the success rates for IVCs. 
4.6 Fund Activity 
The average number of investments per VC in our dataset is 22. For IVCs it is 20 and for 
CVCs it is 30. Although we note that CVCs have a higher number of investments, we refrain 







5. Survival analysis 
In this section we use the framework of survival analysis to study holding periods and their 
relation to successful VC exits. We conduct two forms of analyses; a non-parametric 
approach and a semi-parametric approach. First, the Kaplan-Meier estimator is used to 
present unbiased descriptive statistics of the data, estimating the survival functions and 
differences in these between IVC and CVC investments. Following this, a multivariate, 
competing risks model is used to account for mutually exclusive events and look for 
differences in the hazard of exit amongst different types of investments.   
5.1 General Model 
Survival analysis involves the modelling of time-to-event data. It can be defined as a set of 
methods for analysing data where the outcome variable is the time until the occurrence of an 
event of interest (Kleinbaum & Klein, 2010). Its traditional use has been in medical research, 
were the event of interest has been patient death. However, by treating an investment as the 
“patient” and the successful exit of that investment as “death”, we can use the same 
framework to find the hazard – and survival functions of VC investments.  
The survival function is the probability that a subject survives longer than the given time 
period by not undergoing an event. Contrarily, the hazard function gives us the probability 
that the event will occur at a given time, conditional on the event not having taken place up 
until that time. In our analysis, the hazard function thereby expresses the probability of 
successful exit for an investment at any time, given that no successful exit has previously 
occurred. For the purpose of this analysis, the event is any successful divestment. 
5.1.1 Censoring Observations 
Survival analysis involves following subjects until either the event occurs or the period of 
monitoring ends. Even if we do not observe the event happening, the subject still contributes 
valuable information as we know the minimum length of survival. This happens through 
censored observations. 
 In our dataset we mostly face the issue of right-censored observations. These are subjects 
with incomplete survival times due to a loss to follow up or the event in question not 
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occurring. The data contains several missing observations complicating analysis. Many of 
the investments are still active, and as such we cannot determine if they are successful or not. 
There are also observations with no exit date, but that we know to be failed investments. 
These are included in the analyses up to the last point of follow up, which, if we have no 
other information, is set as one year after investment date. This allows us to include these 
observations in our analyses as a minimum holding period, and the remaining time is 
censored. We cannot know what happened to these investments but, seeing as how we were 
not able to locate an exit date, in most cases it is safe to assume that these are failures. 
However, by marking them as still active as of one year after investment date, a minimum 
holding period is included in the analysis before censoring. This lessens the bias in our 
analysis compared to if we were to exclude them all together. Investments that are still active 
are marked as still active as of 01.06.2018. 15 observations are excluded due to no entry or 
exit date.  
5.2 A Non-Parametric Analysis 
First, a non-parametric approach is applied, meaning no assumptions are made concerning 
the shape of the parameters in the underlying data. We use it to present unbiased descriptive 
statistics of the data by censoring observations without complete holding periods and 
estimating the survival functions.  
5.2.1 The Kaplan-Meier Estimator 
The Kaplan-Meier estimator (Kaplan & Meier, 1958) is a non-parametric approach to 
estimate survival functions, which, without the censored observations, would simply present 
the empirical distribution of the data.  
The model is based on a univariate method of analysis and is therefore limited in its ability 
to estimate survival adjusted for covariates, though effective when comparing survival rates 
of two groups. We thus use it initially as a new source of descriptive statistics, detailing the 
survival functions of all investments and to look for differences between IVC and CVC.  
We classify successful exit as the event, and use holding periods in months as the survival 
time, called months-to-exit. As such, in the following analysis, survival reflects failed 
investments, those not resulting in a successful exit for our given time period.  
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The estimator of the survival function is given by 
                                                                                              (5.1)     
where  is the number of observations that are still at risk but have not yet undergone an 
event at time , and  is the number of events at time . The function is a continuous 
product of the conditional probabilities at time , given that the event occurred before . 
 To simplify, the survival probability can be expressed as the number of divestments at a 
given time divided by the number of investments at risk of divesting. Investments at risk are 
not counted in the denominator if they are censored at time . The probability of survival is 
at any point in time the cumulative probability of surviving the preceding time intervals. 
5.2.2 Smoothed Hazard Estimate 
 
Figure 5.1 - smoothed hazard estimate 
We begin our analysis with a smoothed hazard estimate as shown in figure 5.1. This curve 
graphs the hazard function of successful exit for any investment plotted against its duration. 
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We notice a positive duration dependence, suggesting a rising hazard of successful exit as 
time passes. Interestingly, after a peak at around 10 years, the hazard drops before rising 
sharply from 15 years and onward. It must be stressed that we have a very limited number of 
observations with holding periods of this length, but may infer from the data that the 
probability of successfully exiting an investment rises steadily til about 10 years. After this 
divestment becomes less likely. 
5.2.3 Kaplan-Meier with all Investments 
 
Figure 5.2 - Kaplan-Meier survival estimate, all investments.                                                               
An event is defined as any successful exit; IPO, M&A and share sale. No-info observations are 
censored from last known active date. Analysis time is in months, and the number of remaining at risk 
observations are shown in intervals of 50 months. 
The graph in figure 5.2 plots the survival curve of all investments using Kaplan-Meier 
estimation and defining the event of interest as successful exit. An implicit assumption in the 
graph, which affects our understanding of the data, is that all investments will eventually 
come to fruition through a successful exit. Consequently, the investments that do not reach 
the event are censored, and we can see the number of at-risk investments descending as the 
holding periods increase. 
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The graph plots the cumulative probability of surviving a given time. It should be 
emphasized that survival in this case expresses the probability of an investment not resulting 
in a successful exit. The curve gives stepwise estimates of how the cumulative probabilities 
change between intervals. Each horizontal curve represents an interval in which no exit has 
occurred. The vertical distance between the horizontal curves illustrate how the cumulative 
probabilities change with events. As censored investments are not included amongst the 
number at risk, the high number of censored observations means that these results should be 
interpreted cautiously.  
The median survival time is 115 months. This can be interpreted as 50% of all investments 
having a duration of at least 115 months, or nearly 10 years.  
5.2.4 Kaplan-Meier IVC vs CVC 
 
Figure 5.3 - Kaplan-Meier survival estimate, CVC vs. IVC investments.                                         
An event is defined as any successful exit; IPO, M&A and share sale. No-info and still-active 
observations are censored from last known active date. Analysis time is measured in months, and 
the number of remaining at risk observations are shown for IVC and CVC.                                                  
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The graph in figure 5.3 compares the survival functions of IVC and CVC investments. We 
now have two survival functions, plotting the cumulative probabilities of survival against the 
durations of the investments.  
We can graphically discern a trend for CVC investments to initially have a higher survival 
probability and longer durations, meaning they are less likely to lead to a successful exit and 
that the ones that do take longer time to come to fruition. After the two curves cross, the 
number of at-risk observations for CVC are so low that we should be careful with further 
interpretations.  
We are interested in determining if there is a significant difference in the hazard of exit for 
IVC and CVC. To ascertain this, we test for differences in survival functions using the log-
rank test, presented in appendix A.1. We can reject the null hypothesis of equal survival 
functions at the 5% level. In other words, the probabilities of successful exit differ between 
the two, and, as we saw from the graph, CVCs have a lower probability of successful exit 
compared to IVCs. 
5.3 A semi-Parametric Analysis 
We now use a semi-parametric approach, incorporating the concept of competing risks and 
the effects of covariates on the data.  
5.3.1 The Cox Proportional Hazards Model 
The Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972) is a semi-paramateric, multivariate 
regression analysis allowing us to extend the survival analysis to simultanously assess the 
effect of multiple factors on survival time. The model examines how different factors 
influence the event-rate at a specific point in time, called the hazard rate. We refer to these 
factors as covariates.    
The hazard function for subject j is given as 
                                    ,                                    (5.2) 
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where t is the survival time,  are covariates and  are the coefficients that measure the 
impact of the covariates.  is referred to as the baseline hazard, which all participants are 
subject to adjusted for the covariates. Consequently, it reflects the hazard should all 
covariates be equal to zero. The survival times are not assumed to follow any known 
distribution, and the shape of the baseline hazard is thus random. This is the non-parametric 
component of the model.  
The hazard ratio is the hazard of one subject divided by the hazard for another. For 
covariates  and  the hazard ratio can be expressed as 
                               .                                       (5.3) 
Since the baseline hazard is cancelled out, no assumptions are made regarding its shape and 
a non-linear relationship between the hazard function and the predictor variables is assumed. 
However, an assumption is made that the hazard ratios are invariant over time. In other 
words, the effect of a covariant should not change over time when the predictor variables do 
not change over time. This is known as the proportional hazards assumption, and implies 
that the plotted hazard curves for two groups of observations should be proportional and 
cannot cross.  
We can test for the proportional hazards assumption by determining if the Kaplan-Meier 
estimated survival functions of two groups cross. In examining the survival curves of figure 
5.3, we see that these two curves do indeed cross, indicating that the assumption may be 
violated. However, given the low number of CVC observations after the curves cross, we 
conclude that this violation is insignificant for further analysis.  
5.3.2 The Fine and Gray Model of Competing Risks 
The previous models are based on the understanding of the event in interest ultimately 
occurring for each subject, even if it happens after the period of observation. The duration 
between the end of follow-up and event occurrence is consequently censored, as are subjects 
that drop out of the dataset during the period of observation. However, should these subjects 
drop out due to an event that obstructs the event of interest from happening, we risk biased 
estimates.  
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In other words, a written-off investment cannot lead to a successful exit for the VC, and it 
should therefore not be censored in the analysis. The Fine and Gray model (Fine & Gray, 
1999), treats events that obstruct the event of interest from occurring as competing risks to 
deal with this issue. It accounts for these risks by treating subjects as still at risk of 
experiencing the event of interest even though they are no longer able to after having 
experienced a competing event.  
The competing risks model is based on the proportional hazards model, and is also 
semiparametric with the covariates assumed to be proportional. Although only one event is 
recorded for each subject, the model gives partial information on all event types. For 
instance, if an investment is eventually written off, we know that it went a given period of 
time without a succesful exit before failing.  
The competing risk model can then be expressed as an extension of the Cox model: 
                                      .                                     (5.5) 
The cause-specific hazard function for cause also known as the subhazard function, is 
defined as 
                              .                             (5.6) 
This function can be interpreted as the instantaneous risk of cause  occurring at a point in 
time, given that no event has happened so far (Stata, n.d.). The event observations are 
expressed as , with time-to-event T and  as a cause indicator, detailing the type of 
event that occurred.  
The cumulative subhazard for event ,  , is given as the integral of the subhazard function 
from the start of monitoring until . The cumulative incidence function (CIF) can then be 
expressed as 
                                                .                                             (5.7) 
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This function provides the probability of observing the event before a given time when 
accounting for competing risks.  
5.3.3 Competing Risks Analysis  
In the following competing risks analysis, dummy variables for success and failure are 
introduced following the logic that a liquidated investment cannot lead to a successful exit 
and therefore should not be censored. Investments that are still active are characterized by 
success = 0 and failure = 0 throughout their lifetime and are promptly right censored after 
their last known active date.  
 
Figure 5.4 - Cumulative incidence function, CVC vs. IVC.                                                            
The event in interest is any successful exit; IPO, M&A and share sale. Competing events are 
failed investments; write-offs and secondary sales. No-info and still-active investments are 
censored from last known active date. Analysis time is measured in months.                                                                                                    
Figure 5.4 shows the cumulative incidence function – the probability of exit before a given 
time in months when accounting for competing events - for IVC and CVC. The graphs are 
proportional to allow for the proportional hazards’ assumption. Once more we discern a 
trend of lower probability of successful exits for CVC investments. In using the competing 
risks approach we further notice that in not censoring competing events the graph reflects a 
lower cumulative probability of successful exit as time passes.  
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Table 5.2 - Competing risks regression     
This table presents the subhazard estimates of successful exit; IPO, M&A and share sale. Competing 
events are any failed investment; write-offs and secondary sales. No-info and still-active investments are 
censored from last known active date. The dependent variable equals one in the month of a successful 
exit. CVC is a dummy variable equal to one if the investment is done by a CVC fund. Seed is a dummy 
variable equal to one if the investment is done in the seed stage of the PC. The sector dummies 
Cleantech, Consumer, Energy, ICT, Industrial and LifeScience equal one if the investment is done in 
their respective sector.         














 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
     
CVC 0.502**   0.435** 
 (-2.69)   (-3.14) 
     
Seed  0.713*  0.697* 
  (-2.12)  (-2.11) 
     
Cleantech   0.319** 0.304** 
   (-3.01) (-3.11) 
     
Consumer   0.829 0.865 
   (-0.38) (-0.29) 
     
Energy   0.985 0.882 
   (-0.05) (-0.42) 
     
ICT   1.105 1.048 
   (0.42) (0.19) 
     
Industrial   0.849 0.829 
   (-0.44) (-0.50) 
     
LifeScience   0.522* 0.507 
   (-2.02) (-2.11) 
 
     
     
     
No. of obs. 
No. of events  
No. compet. 
No. censor. 























*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively 





Table 5.2 presents the results of the competing risks regression where we have introduced 
dummy variables for covariates of sector, stage and CVC. This allows us to consider the 
differences from the baseline hazard of these covariates to determine if there are differences 
in the hazard of successful exits. 
The competing risks method shows the estimated coefficients known as subhazard ratios. 
We can interpret them in the following way: a ratio above one implies that if the dummy 
covariate equals one, the incidence of exit is raised relative to the baseline hazard, whereas a 
ratio below one lowers the incidence of exit.  
We identify three statistically significant covariates in our regression; CVC, seed and 
cleantech.  
CVC investments are significant at the 1% level at lowering the incidence of successful exit.  
This confirms our suspicion based on the plotted cumulative incidence function in figure 4.4 
and the results from the Kaplan-Meier estimator, as well as the hypothesis formulated under 
research question I.  
Guo et al. (2015) provide evidence of longer durations for CVC-backed PCs, as well as a 
general trend for VC investments with a longer duration to have an increased likelihood of 
acquisition exit. Our findings up to this point are in line with their initial result, as CVCs 
seem to hold on to investments longer. However, some other mechanism must be at play 
hindering the success rates of CVCs specifically since these are lower.   
It is important to bear in mind that, given our binomial classifications of investment 
outcomes as successes or failures, this analysis does not present any indication of differences 
in returns. It could be theorized, based on the literature reviewed in section 2, that the 
structural differences in CVC funds lead to differences in risk attitude. Following this, CVC 
funds may gather higher returns on the investments that do succeed. However, there is a 
strategic component to CVC investing that suggests the differences in success rate may be 
explained in the motivations behind such investing in the first place.  
It is possible that, in strategically acquiring a portfolio company, the parent of the CVC fund 
chooses to silently incorporate the PC into its business. There are few incentives to disclose 
such an acquisition (Scott, 1994). In doing so, we would not be able to confirm it as a 
successful exit, and it would consequently be included as a failure in the data. We theorize 
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that the parent company could provide an exit opportunity for the CVCs portfolio companies 
for strategic reasons. 
One motivation could be to get a foothold in a new market linked to the parent corporation’s 
primary business. A portfolio company with an innovative technology or business plan could 
provide a platform from which the parent is able to expand to a new market.  
Dimitrova (2015) finds that corporate parent companies acquire their CVC units’ PCs when 
the PC shows signs of outperforming the parent in terms of innovativeness. A parent 
acquisition could thus be linked to declining technological output at the corporation, but also 
work as a means through which competition is reduced.  Dushnitsky & Lenox (2005) 
suggest that the motivation behind establishing corporate venturing units in the first place is 
to harvest innovation from new ventures, thereby working to some degree as a substitute for 
other innovation programs. Empirically, the study shows that an increase in CVC 
investments is associated with a subsequent increase in firm patenting. 
 If corporate venturing is used as an initiative to increase R&D output, the success rate 
would presumably be lower because the primary objective is not to maximize returns. 
Seed investments are significant at the 5% level at lowering the incidence of successful exit.  
This supports our hypothesis as formulated in research question III; that seed investments 
would have a lower success rate. There is an intuitive interpretation of this result. Seed 
investments are, as discussed in section 2, relatively small investments in the very early stage 
of a company’s development. It is generally provided as a means for the entrepreneur to 
prove a concept and commence the initial process of assembling a team of employees, 
conducting market research, and developing a business plan. There is therefore an inherently 
higher risk in providing seed capital as opposed to investing in companies at later stages of 
development, which we can see reflected in the subhazard ratios. Our results indicate that 
seed investments have a 30% lower chance of leading to a successful exit relative to the 
baseline hazard of other investments.  
Investments in cleantech are significant at the 1% level at lowering the incidence of 
successful exit.  
The only sector that provides a significant difference in the hazard of exit is cleantech, with a 
70% lower chance of leading to a successful exit. A considerable amount of the observations 
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within this sector are in clean energy companies devoted to solar energy, wind energy and 
biofuel.  
A possible explanation for the low hazard of exit within cleantech is the capital-intensive 
nature of this area of business and the fact that our time period includes the 1990s and early 
2000s – a period in which many of the technologies utilized in this sector were in their 
infancy. Commercializing these technologies at scale can be challenging, and consequently 
one might infer a higher risk associated with investing in the sector. It could further be 
postulated that a lack of viable exit opportunities leads to fewer successful divestments 
within this sector. Ghosh and Nanda (2010) suggest that there is a “bottleneck” in the scaling 
up process of the clean energy sector in which a lack of incumbent buyers inhibits the VC 
from handing over the investment once a start-up reaches a juncture of potential acquisition. 
As the portfolio company develops in capital intensive industries, its infrastructural and 
managerial requirements increase until it is outside the scope of an entrepreneurial workforce 
to be handled. Other, similar industries have evolved to the point where incumbent 
corporations often provide an exit opportunity at this pre-commercial stage, however, energy 
producing firms are generally reluctant to assist in this regard (Ghosh & Nanda, 2010). As 
there are fewer exit opportunities at this stage for clean energy companies, the investments 




6. Logistic Regression 
This section presents the cursory results of a logistic regression conducted as a robustness 
check to test the results of the previous analyses with a different model. In using a logistic 
model with a binary dependent variable, we are able to see if our findings indicate the same 
trends as the survival analyses in section 5. 
The weakness of this approach is that, as opposed to in the survival analyses, we are unable 
to include observations without a complete holding period in the model. The data thus 
consists of 377 investments. We conduct two regressions with the dummy variable success 
as the dependent variable; one simple regression and one with an added fixed fund effect. 
Once more we classify investment outcomes as either successes or failures.  
6.1 Model 
6.1.1 General Model 
Regression analyses are used to examine associations between an outcome and selected 
independent variables or determine the accuracy of the independent variables to predict an 
outcome (Wooldridge, 2012). There are different types of regression depending on the 
research objective and the nature of the variables. Linear regressions are the most commonly 
used and assumes a linear relationship that follows a straight line between the dependent and 
independent variables. The success rate of investment i is a function of the independent 
variables affecting that investment:      
                (6.1)             
where  represents the intercept and x represents the slope coefficient: the effect of a one 
unit increase on the related independent variable. 
6.1.2 Logistic Regression 
The logistic regression has many similarities to the linear model, but retains the value of the 
dependent variable to within zero and one. Due to the binary nature of our dependent 
variable we use logistic regression to predict the relationship between the independent 
 44 
variables, predictors, and our dependent, predicted variable (Wooldridge, 2012). We are 
then able to estimate the probabilities of successful exits as a function of the predictors.  
The probability of success is given as 
      (6.2) 
 
Which is then transformed using the logistic function 
 
                                       (6.3)   
There are several conditions required for the regression to be unbiased and efficient16. To 
validate the model, tests were run for misspecification17, multicollinearity18 and 
heteroscedasticity19. We found no misspecification issues in the models, and by excluding 
fund activity in the regressions with fixed fund effect, we removed multicollinearity between 
the variables. The tests revealed no heteroscedasticity, but robust standard errors were added 
as a precaution in case of undetected heteroscedasticity.  
The model further relies on a random sample. We refer to the discussion in section 3.4 
regarding selection bias in the original dataset of 505 observations. However, as 128 
observations have been removed, most of which we can assume to be failed investments, 
there is a certain degree of bias in the following regression. Results must be interpreted with 
this in mind.  
To control for individual fund characteristics and reduce potential omitted variable bias, a 
fixed fund effect is included. As many years did not have the sufficient number of 
                                                 
16 First, the variables in the regression must have a linear relationship. Secondly, the sample must be random. Third, there 
should be no multicollinearity between all variables. The fourth and final assumption requires the error term to have an 
expected value of zero given the value of all independent variables. (Wooldridge, 2012). In addition, there must be an 
absence of heteroscedasticity for the model to be efficient. 
17 We used the Stata command «linktest» in order to detect potential issues of misspecification in the logit model. See 
appendix A.2.  
18 We used the Stata command “VIF” to detect potential multicollinearity between variables. See appendix A.3. 
19 We conducted a Breusch-Pagan test to detect heteroscedasticity. To reduce potential undetected heteroscedasticity, we 
included robust standard errors. See appendix A.4. 
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investments to include fixed years effects, and some investment years created 
multicollinearity issues, we elected to not include a fixed year effect in the regression.  
6.1.2 Dependent Variable 
To examine the determinants of success rate, we choose a binomial dependent variable in 
both regression models. The dependent variable would then yield the probability of success 
given all included variables representing characteristics of the investment and characteristics 
of the invested fund.  
6.1.3 Independent Variables 
In addition to the variables that have been used in the previous analyses, we add a fixed fund 
effect to control for individual fund characteristics.  
The data comprises ranges from VCs conducting only a few investments to those with 
dozens. To control for fund specific performance differences, a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
more than 10 investments has been made by the same VC is added. In doing so, 18 fund 
dummies are added to the model. 
6.2 Results 
Table 6.1 below presents the results of the regressions.  
Positive coefficients indicate an increase in the probability of success by the correspondent 
independent variable, while negative coefficients indicate a decline in the probability of 
success by the correspondent independent variable. 
If all the dummy variables equal zero the investment is in the other sector, the venture stage, 
or done by an IVC. If all fund dummies equal zero, the investment was made by a fund with 






Table 6.1 Logistic regression results  
 (1) Logit(Success) (2) Logit(Success) 
 Cleantech -2.294*** (0.557) -2.211*** (0.582) 
 Consumer -1.001 (0.733) -1.184 (0.756) 
 Energy -0.831 (0.521) -0.794 (0.568) 
 ICT -0.262 (0.480) -0.441 (0.491) 
 Industrial -0.980 (0.637) -0.663 (0.690) 
 Lifescience -1.370** (0.526) -1.325* (0.551) 
 Seed -0.510* (0.257) -0.369 (0.428) 
 Fund activity -0.028* (0.012)   
 CVC -1.250** (0.419) -0.870 (1.008) 
 Monthstoexit -0.015*** (0.003) -0.016*** (0.003) 
 F1   -1.424 (0.787) 
 F2   0.110 (0.728) 
 F3   -2.530* (1.217) 
 F4   -1.500** (0.535) 
 F5   0.530 (1.170) 
 F6   -2.485* (1.130) 
 F7   0.641 (0.702) 
 F8   -0.095 (0.569) 
 F9   -1.105 (0.831) 
 F10   -0.011 (0.736) 
 F11   -0.098 (0.635) 
 F12   -0.108 (0.558) 
 F13   0.342 (0.625) 
 F14   -0.602 (0.810) 
 F15   0.164 (0.767) 
 F16   -1.091 (0.711) 
 F17   0.832 (0.973) 
 F18   1.528 (1.131) 
 Constant 2.735*** (0.580) 2.565*** (0.654) 
N 377  377  
R2 0.159  0.242  
Misspecification No  No  
Mean VIF 1.91  1.76  
Heteroskedasticity Used RSE  Used RSE  
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively. 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
R2 is a measure of goodness of fit, representing the percentage of sample variation in dependent variables 
that can be explained by independent variable. No misspecification or multicollinearity issues are present in 
either regression. Robust standard errors are included to control for potential heteroscedasticity. 
CVC is a dummy variable equal to one if the investment is done by a CVC fund. Seed is a dummy variable 
equal to one if the investment is done in the seed stage of the PC. The sector dummies Cleantech, Consumer, 
Energy, ICT, Industrial and LifeScience equal one if the investment is done in their respective sector.               





The results indicate that cleantech and lifescience have a negative impact on success rate, at 
the 0,1% and 5% significance level respectively when including fixed fund effects. This is in 
line with our findings in section 5, although we did not detect a significant difference in the 
hazard of exit for lifescience in the competing risks analysis.  
Once more it must be stressed that the results should be interpreted with our definition of 
success in mind. It could be theorized that, although these sectors provide a lower rate of 
successful exits, the ones that do succeed generate high returns. Lifescience involves a 
number of biotech investments, a sector that, like clean energy, is highly capital intensive 
and requires large investments in order to commercialize (Ghosh & Nanda, 2010). As these 
sectors are significant also when including fixed fund effects, the negative effect on success 
rate cannot be attributed to inferior funds investing in them.  
In the regressions, the sector dummy other, which is excluded, seems to outperform the other 
sectors. Other incorporates all other investment sectors not specifically defined in our data. 
As the sectors in the dataset are likely defined based on certain VC preference for investing 
in them, one could theorize that in investing in companies outside of these sectors, VCs only 
choose the very best prospects. This could explain why other seems to do so well in the data.  
Seed is significant at the 5% level at lowering the probability of successful exit when fixed 
fund effects are not included. This is in line with our findings in section 5. However, when 
including fixed fund effects, the variable loses its significance. This could indicate that there 
are intrinsic differences in the funds that conduct seed investments affecting the success rate 
of this stage.  
CVC is also statistically significant in the simple regression, at the 1% level, but loses 
significance when fixed fund effects are included. This is indicative of characteristics 
common to CVCs having a negative impact on the success rates, but not necessarily that 
being a CVC in itself lowers probability of successful exits.  
We must once again bear in mind the low number of CVC funds when interpreting the 
results when fixed fund effects are included.  
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Fund activity is included in the first regression and is significant at the 5% level at lowering 
the probability of successful exit. Suggesting that funds that invest in a large number of PCs 
experience lower success rates.  
Months-to-exit is significant at the 0.1% level at lowering the probability of exit. The 
interpretation of this is, not surprisingly, that the duration of the investment is impactful on 
the probability of successful exit. The negative impact must be understood in the context of 
the model. Our findings in section 5 indicate a positive duration dependency when censoring 
incomplete observations, and is thus more representative of the underlying data.  
There are some concerns in the logistic regression conducted in this section, most notably 
the failure to include all observations and the bias that arises from this. Still, the regressions 
are meant to be conducted as a robustness check of the general results found in earlier 
analyses. In doing so, we confirm the general trends of the findings in section 5.  
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7. Concluding Remarks 
7.1 Summary 
This thesis has investigated some of the determinants of success rates and holding periods in 
the Norwegian market for venture capital investments. The main purpose has been to provide 
a descriptive analysis of the investments themselves and to uncover if there are variations 
with regards to investment outcome and duration across sectors, stage and fund type. 
Empirically, the analyses have been conducted through the framework of survival analyses, 
using both a non-parametric and semi-parametric approach, and then verified against the 
backdrop of a logistic regression.  
Our analyses indicated a significant difference between IVCs and CVCs. CVCs seem to 
experience fewer successful exits and hold their investments longer on average before 
divesting. This could be explained by the inherent structural differences between the two 
types of investors, and we speculate that strategic motives of the parent corporation could 
explain some of the differences. In addition, we find that some of the variation between the 
two fund types can be attributed to individual fund characteristics amongst the CVCs.  
We have thus found empirical evidence in support of our hypothesis as developed in 
research question I.  
In research question II we wanted to determine if there were significant differences between 
sectors.  
When conducting the survival analysis, we only found one sector with a significantly lower 
incidence of successful exit, the cleantech sector. We theorize that a possible explanation for 
this might be the capital-intensive nature of companies operating in this sector and a lack of 
exit options compared to many other sectors. This result is confirmed in the logistic 
regression, also when accounting for fixed fund effects. The logistic regression further 
indicates that lifescience significantly lowers the probability of successful exit, a result we 
did not find in the competing risks model. 
We further found that seed investments experience a lower rate of successful exit than 
investments done at later stages. This result is not surprising given the intuitively higher risk 
of investing in a company before much business development has been undertaken. In the 
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logistic regression this result is confirmed, however, when accounting for fixed fund effects 
we find that the impact of seed investing loses its significance. This could indicate that there 
is a difference in the funds investing the most in early stages explaining some of the 
differences.  
These findings partially support our hypothesis in research question III. Seed investments 
seem to experience a lower rate of successful exits, though we cannot be certain if it is the 
act of investing at this stage itself or the funds that do this form of investments that are the 
cause.  
The results presented in this thesis should be interpreted with our definition of success in 
mind. In categorizing investments as either successes or failures, a lot of nuances are lost due 
to not accounting for varying degrees of success. Collecting data on returns for all 
investments in the dataset proved inexpedient for the scope of this thesis, which was why we 
rather chose to classify investment outcomes based on the general sustainability of the 
outcomes themselves.  
Although in particular the survival analysis is suited for observations with missing exit dates, 
we would naturally have preferred full durations for all investments. Missing observations 
on holding periods is thus a limitation to this thesis. In addition, there are a number of 
variables thought to influence the success rates and durations that we have not been able to 
analyse. One of these are macroeconomic conditions, which we would expect to influence 
the exit decision and duration of the investments. We leave this to future researchers on the 
topic. Although the number of CVC investments were high, a higher number of CVC funds 








7.2 Suggestions for Further Research 
We have complemented the original dataset from the Argentum Centre with complete 
holding periods on a majority of the VC investments. This provides a platform from which a 
number of interesting studies could be conducted. A natural starting point would be to 
further distinguish between different types of exits, for example by looking for differences in 
the time-to-event for IPOs and trade sales.  
Tian and Wang (2011) construct a measure for failure tolerance based on the holding periods 
and number of investment rounds of failed investments. The willingness to continue 
investing in underperforming ventures is then linked to a higher degree of innovativeness 
with the portfolio companies. Replicating this study for the Norwegian market could prove 
very interesting, especially given the current discussion on how to raise innovativeness in the 
Norwegian economy.  
The discussion of the findings in section 5 further opens up for potential topics to 
investigate.   
We anticipate that as the trend of corporate venturing increases in Norway, more data on 
exits within this segment will become available. Our main findings concerning the 
differences between CVCs and IVCs could then be checked using a larger empirical 
foundation. Furthermore, if statistics were to become available on parent acquisitions in a 
corporate venture setting, the motivations for such activity could be examined in detail.  
As the topic of clean energy becomes ever more relevant, an in-depth analysis of why the 
rate of successful exit is so low within cleantech would be interesting.  
Lastly, it could be interesting to see if the trends uncovered in this thesis are the same across 
the Nordics, or if there are inherent differences in success rates and holding periods between 
the countries and when cross-border investing.  
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    A.1 Log-Rank Test 
               Pr>chi2 =     0.0269
               chi2(1) =       4.90
Total            176         176.00
                                   
1, 0              15          25.23
0, 1             161         150.77
                                   
CVC, IVC    observed       expected
             Events         Events
Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions
 
 
     A.2 Misspecification Test 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Success Success 
   
Predicted 0.955*** 0.858*** 
 (0.131) (0.113) 
   
Predictedsq -0.143 -0.158 
 (0.113) (-0.074) 
   
_cons 0.116 0.020 
 (0147) (0.150) 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively 
Standard errors in parenthesis.  
To test for functional form misspecification, we ran a logistic regression where the predicted values and the 
squares of the predicted values are regressed on the dichotomous dependent variable. Under the null 
hypothesis, if the model is correctly specified then the square of the predicted values would not be 




         A.3 Test for Multicollinearity 












The table presents the variance inflation factors (VIFs). The ratios are used as independent variables to 
estimate the effect of a coefficient due to correlation with other variables. A VIF value above 10 implies 











 Model 2    Model 1  
     VIF   1/VIF      VIF   1/VIF 
 CVC 7.997 .125  ICT 3.799 .263 
 F3 5.58 .179  Energy 2.559 .391 
 ICT 4.223 .237  LifeScience 2.528 .396 
 F5 3.364 .297  Cleantech 2.467 .405 
 Seed 3.298 .303  Industrial 1.656 .604 
 Energy 2.913 .343  Consumer 1.42 .704 
 LifeScience 2.772 .361  Fund activity 1.231 .813 
 Cleantech 2.64 .379  CVC 1.222 .818 
 Industrial 1.776 .563  Seed 1.118 .895 
 F8 1.597 .626  Monthstoexit 1.074 .931 
 F4 1.587 .63  Mean VIF 1.907  
 F9 1.492 .67 
 Consumer 1.475 .678 
 F11 1.472 .679 
 F12 1.431 .699 
 F13 1.412 .708 
 F10 1.393 .718 
 F14 1.358 .737 
 F17 1.325 .755 
 F6 1.317 .759 
 F15 1.31 .764 
 F7 1.277 .783 
 F16 1.247 .802 
 F2 1.216 .823 
 F18 1.201 .833 
 F1 1.19 .84 
 M.to.exit 1.179 .848 
 Mean VIF 2.187  
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     A.4 Heteroscedasticity test – Model 1 
  
Linear regression Model 1 
 e2  Coef.(SE)   
 Cleantech -0.363 (0.274)  
 Consumer -0.038 (0.393)  
 Energy -0.362 (0.272)  
 ICT -0.004 (0.239)  
 Industrial -0.319 (0.337)  
 LifeScience -0.335 (0.267)  
 Seed -0.101 (0.133)  
Fund activity -0.007 (0.006)  
 CVC -0.174 (0.199)  
 Monthstoexit -0.001 (0.002)  
 Constant 1.437*** (0.293)  
 
Mean dependent var 1.011 SD dependent var  1.169 
R-squared  0.031 Number of obs   377.000 
F-test   1.155 Prob > F  0.320 
Akaike crit. (AIC) 1197.204 Bayesian crit. (BIC) 1240.458 
 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively 
Standard errors in parenthesis. 
 To test whether our models are exposed to heteroscedasticity we conducted a Breusch-Pagan test. If the 
squared residuals can be attributed to changes in independent variables, there is a problem of 
heteroscedasticity. The p-value (0.320>0.05) does not reject the nullhypothsis of homoscedasticity. For 
precautionary reasons, we still include robust standard errors in regression 1. Robust standard errors requires 












      A.4 Heteroscedasticity test – Model 2 
Linear regression Model 2 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 5, 1 and 0.1 percent level, respectively 
 Standard errors in parenthesis.  
To test whether our models are exposed to heteroscedasticity we conducted a Breusch-Pagan test. If the 
squared residuals can be attributed to changes in independent variables, there is a problem of 
heteroscedasticity. The p-value (0.14>0.05) does not reject the nullhypothsis of homoscedasticity. For 
precautionary reasons, we include robust standard errors in regression 2. Robust standard errors requires the 
sample size to be large and our sample size of 377 observations is likely sufficient. 
 
 
 e2 Coef.(SE) 
 Cleantech -0.076* (0.045) 
 Consumer -0.018 (0.064) 
 Energy -0.086* (0.046) 
 ICT -0.028 (0.040) 
 Industrial -0.084 (0.056) 
 LifeScience -0.072 (0.044) 
 Seed -0.057 (0.036) 
 CVC -0.109 (0.081) 
 Monthstoexit 0.000 (0.000) 
 F1 -0.037 (0.062) 
 F2 -0.094 (0.060) 
 F3 -0.061 (0.085) 
 F4 -0.037 (0.043) 
 F5 0.128 (0.096) 
 F6 -0.090 (0.063) 
 F7 -0.052 (0.055) 
 F8 0.006 (0.049) 
 F9 -0.017 (0.062) 
 F10 0.002 (0.062) 
 F11 -0.020 (0.054) 
 F12 -0.067 (0.047) 
 F13 -0.076 (0.050) 
 F14 0.002 (0.064) 
 F15 -0.082 (0.058) 
 F16 0.031 (0.059) 
 F17 -0.155** (0.069) 
 F18 -0.121* (0.065) 
 Constant 0.297*** (0.052) 
 
Mean dependent var 0.177 SD dependent var  0.188 
R-squared  0.092 Number of obs   377.000 
F-test   1.313 Prob > F  0.140 
Akaike crit. (AIC) -171.983 Bayesian crit. (BIC) -61.881 
 
